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In deductive reasoning, people are asked
to infer the truth of an argument’s con-
clusion given a set of premises. Research
into the processes underlying deduction
has focused on examining how well peo-
ple discriminate between logically valid
and invalid arguments, and how irrele-
vant factors such as one’s prior beliefs
interfere with the ability to reason log-
ically (Evans et al., 1983). This norma-
tive approach to validity has traditionally
informed both practice and theory in the
literature. However, its critics argue that
“normativism” often leads investigators to
biased or misleading interpretations of
phenomena (Elqayam and Evans, 2011).
Formal modeling of deductive reason-
ing has often been successful by taking
the traditional, normative approach. A
case in point is the application of sig-
nal detection theory (SDT; Macmillan and
Creelman, 2005) to the investigation of
belief bias in syllogistic reasoning (Dube
et al., 2010). In the SDT model, deduc-
tive judgments are based on strength of
evidence; an argument is judged to be
valid if its strength exceeds a criterion
value. Because the choice of criterion is
independent of the ability to discriminate
between classes of arguments, the SDT
model makes it possible to isolate response
bias from accuracy. Dube et al. exam-
ined these two factors using ROC curves,
which plot hits against false alarms at sev-
eral levels of confidence. Hits and false
alarms were defined in normative fashion
as responding “valid” to logically valid and
logically invalid conclusions, respectively.
Their analysis of ROCs led them
to argue two significant points. First,
contrary to prevailing theories of belief
bias, conclusion believability can affect
response bias without affecting the qual-
ity of reasoning. Second, the curvilin-
ear shape of the ROCs is consistent with
the distributional assumptions of SDT.
The latter is a key test because find-
ing linear rather than curvilinear ROCs
would be problematic for the model. The
curvilinear ROCs obtained in syllogis-
tic (see also Dube et al., 2011; Trippas
et al., 2013; but see Klauer and Kellen,
2011) and other forms of reasoning (Heit
and Rotello, 2010, 2014) are similar to
those widely observed in memory and
perception (Pazzaglia et al., 2013). This
consistency across domains strengthens
the case for the usefulness of the SDT
approach. It also leads to an expecta-
tion of similar findings in other areas
of reasoning. Below, we describe find-
ings from conditional reasoning that vio-
late this expectation in a surprising yet
enlightening way.
Causal conditionals are a form of
deduction prevalent in everyday life.
Consider the proposition: “If healthy
foods are cheaper, then more people will
eat healthy foods.” Four types of con-
ditional inferences are possible: modus
ponens (MP; “Healthy foods are cheaper,
therefore more people will eat healthy
foods”), modus tollens (MT; “Fewer peo-
ple eat healthy foods, therefore healthy
foods are not cheaper”), affirmation of
the consequent (AC; “More people eat
healthy foods, therefore healthy foods are
cheaper”), and denial of the antecedent
(DA; “Healthy foods are not cheaper,
therefore less people eat healthy foods”).
From a normative point of view, MP
and MT are valid and AC and DA are
invalid inferences. Theories differ as to
how people determine validity in these
problems. According to mental model
theory (Johnson-Laird and Byrne, 2002),
people construct an initial mental model
of the conditional (e.g., p q) which may
then be fleshed out by considering addi-
tional models (not-p q; not-p not-q).
According to the suppositional account
of the conditional (Evans et al., 2003,
2005; Evans and Over, 2004, 2012), peo-
ple evaluate the subjective probability of
a conditional by hypothetically suppos-
ing p and then assessing the conditional
probability of q given p, P(q|p). This
relation between the natural language
conditional and the conditional proba-
bility, P(if p then q) = P(q|p), can be used
in a Bayesian/probabilistic model of con-
ditional inference (Oaksford et al., 2000;
Oaksford and Chater, 2009, 2013).
What these theories have in common
is that there is no fundamental difference
in how people process affirmation (MP +
AC) and denial (MT + DA) inferences.
This makes an SDT analysis straightfor-
ward and no different to that taken with
the study of belief bias in syllogistic rea-
soning. For our case study, we analyzed
aspects of a data set collected as part of a
larger project under the direction of the
fourth author of this paper1. This study
examined the influence of belief in causal
conditional problems (e.g., believable: “If
oil prices continue to rise, then UK
1 This research was supported by the award of an ESRC
project grant RES-062-23-3285.
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petrol prices will rise”; unbelievable: “If
global temperatures rise, then less arctic
ice will melt”). Hits were defined as “valid”
responses to MP and MT and false alarms
were defined as “valid” responses to AC
and DA. This produced the ROCs seen
in the top panel of Figure 1. The results
are similar in some respects to those
reported by Dube et al. (2010) for syl-
logisms: believability had no effect on
accuracy (ROCs for believable and unbe-
lievable items fall on the same curve) but
seemed to affect response bias (confidence
criteria for believable items are shifted to
the right)2. However, there is a surprising
difference: in contrast to the curvilinear
ROCs observed with syllogisms, condi-
tionals produced linear ROCs. A linear
regression of the ROC (collapsing over
believability) provided a good fit, R2 =
99.9%. Adding a quadratic component did
not improve the fit, p = 0.78. Taken at face
value, this result suggests that conditional
reasoning requires a profoundly different
2 Note that the current data pattern does not necessi-
tate a criterion shift, but that it is also consistent with
a symmetrical distribution shift. For more discussion
on this issue, see, e.g., Verde et al. (2010).
model than the one that has seemed so
successful when applied to other forms of
reasoning, not to mention other cognitive
tasks.
A different picture emerges when
we depart from the strictly normative
approach and consider separately how
people respond to affirmation and denial
conditionals. In the bottom left panel of
Figure 1, plotting MP (hits) against AC
(false alarms) yields typically curvilinear
ROCs. Linear regression (collapsing over
believability) provided a fit, R2 = 96%,
that was significantly improved by the
FIGURE 1 | ROC curves of causal conditionals. Top panel: Valid (MP +
MT) vs. invalid (AC + DA). Bottom left: affirmation conditionals (MP vs.
AC). Bottom right: denial conditionals (MT vs. DA). Points on the ROC
imply a more liberal response criterion (lower confidence responses) for
identical levels of sensitivity. The points are plotted cumulatively such
that the leftmost point = high confidence hits vs. false alarms, with the
next point down being high + medium confidence hits vs. false alarms,
and so forth.
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addition of a quadratic component,
R2 = 99.99%, p < 0.004. Accuracy is
defined by the distance of the ROCs from
the chance diagonal. Contrary to the poor
accuracy on display in the aggregate results
in the top panel, people are quite sensitive
to argument structure when affirmation
is involved. In the bottom right panel
of Figure 1, plotting MT (hits) against
DA (false alarms) again yields typically
curvilinear ROCs. Linear regression (col-
lapsing over believability) provided a fit,
R2 = 98%, that was significantly improved
by the additional of a quadratic compo-
nent, R2 = 99.99%, p < 0.002. People
were sensitive to argument structure, but
the position of the ROCs below the diago-
nal indicates that their treatment of denial
arguments departed from the normative;
MT are treated as less valid than AC.
Applying the SDT model in a normative
fashion, as would seem reasonable given
extant theories of conditional reasoning,
produced results that contrast sharply with
previous findings. The clearly linear ROC
in the top panel of Figure 1 is not only
unlike the curvilinear ROCs observed with
syllogisms but if taken at face value is prob-
lematic for the SDT model. It could be that
there is something fundamentally differ-
ent in the way that people reason about
causal conditionals as compared to other
types of problems. It seems to us more
likely that the difference lies with affirma-
tion and denial inferences; the latter do
not seem to be treated in the normatively
prescribed fashion. Once this is assumed,
the ROC results become more sensible
and fall in line with previous results (in
a reanalysis of published and unpublished
data sets, Heit and Rotello, 2014, have
also reported curvilinear ROCs from MP
plotted in the manner of Figure 1, lower
left). This interpretation converges with
Singmann and Klauer’s (2011) finding,
based on state-trace analysis, that affirma-
tion and denial problems may depend on
different processes.
Why use ROC analysis rather than
simply examine the raw validity judg-
ments? Interpreting the latter often relies
on assumptions that may not be justified
(Klauer et al., 2000; Dube et al., 2010).
The main advantage of a formal model
like SDT lies in its specification of assump-
tions. However, models can also produce
insights that are not obvious at first glance.
A qualitative difference between affirma-
tion and denial inferences is not necessar-
ily predicted by extant theories. Moreover,
various manipulations seem to exert a sim-
ilar effect on both types of inferences (e.g.,
Cummins, 1995). Finally, it is interesting
to note that the production of linear ROCs
when performance is driven by multiple
underlying processes has been predicted in
theory (DeCarlo, 2002). These results may
offer a case study of how this can occur in
practice.
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